

Seeing Spanish: The Effects of Language-Based Media Choices on Resentment and Belonging*

Abstract

Does seeing Spanish-language news in the media change the racial and political attitudes of Whites and Spanish-speaking Latinos? We examine the effects of Spanish-language media on White and Spanish-speaking Latino attitudes using online survey experiments in English and Spanish, respectively. We expect White Americans to react to Spanish-language media options by developing more hostile attitudes towards Hispanics, and Spanish-speaking Latino audiences to feel a greater sense of belonging in America when they see Spanish represented in the media. We find that seeing articles about non-immigration politics in Spanish, as an option next to English articles, significantly raises racial resentment towards Hispanics among Whites. Among Spanish-speaking Latinos, seeing a political news article option in Spanish increases feelings of inclusion and belonging, even when it is not about a racialized issue like immigration. Such evidence suggests that language alone may prime identity and shape political attitudes for White and Spanish-speaking Latino voters.¹

Keywords: Media, Spanish-language, racial attitudes, Hispanics, Whites, social identity

*We would like to thank participants at the Politics, Race, Immigration and Ethnicity Consortium (PRIEC) Conference in December 2018 and discussants at MPSA 2017 and APSA 2018 for helpful comments and feedback. We would also like to thank Emmerich Davies and Azalea Andrade for their assistance with translation of our surveys.

¹Data and replication files can be found here: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/VOW9OB>. Funding for the Qualtrics and MTurk surveys were made possible by the Darlene and Thomas O. Ryder Professorship 3, from the Manship School at LSU. The Manship School had no input in the study design or interpretation of the data.

Introduction

The number of Spanish-speakers in the United States grew rapidly in recent decades, and the Spanish-language media options available grew accordingly. Today, more than 40 million U.S. residents aged 5 and older speak Spanish at home, a 133.4 percent increase since 1990 (Bureau 2017). Changes in the media environment have increased daily exposure to the language for English and Spanish speakers alike: in 2017, the two largest Spanish-language television networks, Univision and Telemundo, attracted an average of 1.8 million and 1.5 million prime time viewers, respectively (James 2017). While print news consumption is down across the board, the top 20 Spanish-language weekly and semi-weekly newspapers reach 92,000 households, and over 1,500 FCC registered Spanish-language radio stations deliver news and entertainment across the nation (Shearer 2017). From 2000-2008, as shown in Figure 1, the number of counties across the United States with a Spanish-language media option increased dramatically.

[Figure 1 near here]

Politicians have tried to appeal to Spanish speakers since the 1960s, when Jackie Kennedy delivered a Spanish-language advertisement advocating on behalf of her husband. Since then, presidential candidates have commonly used Spanish-language advertising, including Jeb Bush and Hillary Clinton in 2016, in addition to congressional and gubernatorial candidates across the nation. Florida Governor Rick Scott, for example, spent \$1 million in April 2018 to air Spanish-language television ads in his 2018 Senate race (Dixon 2018)

While the rising prevalence of Spanish-language media leads to increased voter turnout (Hopkins 2011; Panagopoulos and Green 2011; Soto and Merolla 2006) and feelings of inclusion among Spanish-speakers (Casillas 2014), it increases the salience of group divisions (Pérez and Tavits 2019b) and raises anxiety and hostility among non-Spanish speakers. This is seen in the frustration of some about customer service lines that prompt callers to “press one for English” (Grabar 2017) and through threats by White Americans to call ICE on Spanish-speaking restaurant customers (Wang 2018). For many White English-speaking Americans, exposure to Spanish primes ethnic group differences (Pérez and Tavits 2019b), creates barriers to interpersonal relations, induces cultural threat, and leads to harsher immigration policy posi-

tions (Citrin, Reingold, Walters and Green 1990; Citrin and Wright 2009; Enos 2014; Hopkins 2014; Hopkins, Tran and Williamson 2014; Newman, Hartman and Taber 2012; Schildkraut 2007).

In this article, we expand on the existing literature by examining the effects of exposure to Spanish-language media. We assess the influence of Spanish-language (SL) media on the attitudes of Whites and Latinos using experimental evidence from online studies. Our analysis is distinct from others and offers a novel contribution in at least four ways. First, we bring recent theoretical insights about the psychological underpinnings of language as a cue (e.g., Pérez 2016) to the domain of news media, which has well-documented effects on political attitudes and behavior, especially pertaining to racial and ethnic groups (e.g., Dixon 2008; Abrajano and Singh 2009).² Second, we explore the consequences of exposure to the availability of Spanish-language news stories across different subject areas of news content: politics and sports. In doing so, our goal is examine whether exposure to Spanish, when mediated, has similar effects outside the domain of politics (e.g., Boroditsky 2001), the context of survey interviews (e.g., Pérez 2016), in-person exposure to interpersonal dialogues (e.g., Enos 2014), strategic campaign communications (e.g., Ostfeld 2017), and immigration attitudes (e.g., Hopkins 2014). Third, we conduct relatively conservative tests of the effects of language as a cue - at least with respect to its impact on inter-group attitudes. While other work has examined exposure to Spanish-language political ads (Ostfeld 2017), full news stories, ballots (Hopkins 2014), interpersonal dialogue (Enos 2014), and online discussions (Hitlan, Kelly, Schepman, Schneider and Zárate 2006), our study explores the extent to which seeing only the headline and a short blurb for Spanish language news stories, as part of an online choice set, is enough to prime ethnic differences in ways that shape group attitudes. Fourth, we examine how exposure to a non-majority language option in news media impacts both majority-language users and those who speak the non-majority language in question. As one of few studies to do so, we provide insight into how language cues affect both groups, and explore the effects of the media

²Arguably, the growth of media available in languages other than English or Spanish in the U.S. warrants further exploration as well, though we focus on Spanish-language media here.

choice environment on minority groups' sense of "belonging." We expand research on media in non-majority languages beyond political participation and cultural assimilation by providing evidence of the possible psychological underpinnings for these normatively important effects.

We find that seeing online news articles about politics in Spanish – even those that do not mention immigration – significantly raises Hispanic racial resentment scores among Whites, while increasing feelings of inclusion and belonging among Spanish-speaking respondents. There are no effects of exposure to SL sports news. We demonstrate that fleeting exposure to the mere availability of SL political news stories influences the attitudes of both English-speaking White and Spanish-speaking Hispanic Americans, even when the topic of political content does not concern policy issues traditionally associated with the Latinx/Hispanic communities.

Effects of media on political and ethnic attitudes

News media, including newspapers, radio, television and the Internet, play a significant role in political socialization, attitude formation, and political engagement (De Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Moeller and de Vreese 2013; Moy, McCluskey, McCoy and Spratt 2004; Stamm, Emig and Hesse 1997).

For White Americans, the impact of the majority, English-language media is well-studied (Dixon 2008; Gilens 2009; Gilliam Jr and Iyengar 2000), but studies of Spanish-language media effects are less common. Mainstream media traditionally caters to White audiences, excluding racial and ethnic minorities or portraying them in narrow, typically negative roles such as fools, criminals, or hypersexual nonprofessionals (Mastro 2009; Tukachinsky, Mastro and Yarchi 2015). Coverage of immigration in the media is racialized, with Latinos becoming the primary focus of such coverage since the 1990s (Chavez 2001; Huntington 2004; Santa Ana 2002; Waldman, Ventura, Savillo, Lin and Lewis 2008). This trend coincides with attitudes about Latinos becoming a better predictor of opinions on immigration (Valentino, Brader and Jardina 2013). Subtle negative group cues in news content can activate racial attitudes, boosting their impact on political judgment and triggering anxiety which in turn, boosts opposition to new immigrants among Whites (Brader, Valentino and Suhay 2008; Mendelberg 2001;

Valentino, Hutchings and White 2002).³

In contrast, for immigrant communities, media in a host country can serve as an important avenue for political assimilation and acculturation (Chaffee, Nass and Yang 1990; Kim 1988; Liu and Gastil 2014; Moon and Park 2007; Park 1922; Viswanath and Arora 2000). News media consumption in both a native language and English increases knowledge of American politics (Dalisyay 2012) and acceptance of American cultural values (Moon and Park 2007). Such news consumption can also help immigrants maintain connections back to their country of origin (Caspi, Adoni, Cohen and Elias 2002; Shi 2005; Sui and Paul 2017), increasing perceptions of political power (Ostfeld 2017), fostering self-esteem (Ramasubramanian, Doshi and Saleem 2017), and cultivating distinct identities (Slater 2007). In the case of Iranians (Naficy 1993) and Venezuelans (Shumow 2010), for example, ethnic media builds an exilic identity, as both of these groups have fled hostile political regimes.

Research suggests that Hispanic/Latinx Americans, in particular, may make television selections based on a desire to bolster ethnic social identity (Ortiz and Behm-Morawitz 2015). There is evidence that these viewers will avoid English-language television in order to protect inter-group identity (Abrams and Giles 2007) and achieve higher levels of group consciousness (Kerevel 2011).⁴ Spanish language news outlets are found to foster a sense of identity for Hispanic/Latinx Americans and can shape viewers' attitudes (De Fina 2013). Such outlets generate more (and more positive) coverage of immigration compared to English-language news outlets (Branton and Dunaway 2008), and as a result, Latinos who consume news in Spanish tend to hold more pro-immigrant sentiments (Abrajano and Singh 2009; Kerevel 2011).

³Research documents that news coverage of Latinos is rife with negative and racial stereotypes (Dixon 2008; Gilens 2009; Gilliam Jr and Iyengar 2000; Mastro and Greenberg 2000; Tukachinsky, Mastro and Yarchi 2015). This tendency extends to news stories about immigration, which overwhelmingly focus on Latino immigration and are predominately negative and focused on illegal immigration and criminality associated with the border or Latino immigrants (Branton and Dunaway 2009; Dunaway, Branton and Abrajano 2010; Waldman et al. 2008). These trends are prolific throughout U.S. mainstream news media; audiences are well conditioned for news stories pertaining to minority groups to be negative.

⁴Even alternative forms of communication, such as being interviewed or surveyed in Spanish, has been found to bolster feelings of linked fate among Latinos (Flores and Coppock 2018; Pérez 2011).

However, for attitudes on non-ethnic policy issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage, scholars have not found SL media to have a distinct effect (Kerevel 2011), raising questions about whether the effect of SL media on policy views is specific to the domain of immigration.

Language as a group cue

A growing body of work suggests that language itself can independently influence political behavior. For example, for some non-Hispanic White, English-speakers, changing the language of a news clip about immigration from English to Spanish can heighten feelings of threat and foster more restrictive policy attitudes (Hopkins 2014). Similarly, when English-speaking monolinguals see a campaign ad in Spanish, their voting intention and affective evaluations of the candidate decline (Flores and Coppock 2018). In other studies, not specific to advertising and the media, daily encounters with Spanish among English speakers at a train station (Enos 2014), in an Internet chatroom (Newman, Hartman and Taber 2012), or on an otherwise English-language survey (Hopkins, Tran and Williamson 2014) are found to increase opposition to immigration.

Partisanship moderates the effects of Spanish-language cues on White attitudes, although results on this front have been mixed. While Hopkins (2014) finds that SL cues heighten anti-immigrant sentiment among White Republicans but not White Democrats, others find that SL political advertisements affect monolingual English speakers similarly, regardless of partisanship (Flores and Coppock 2018) and that White Americans across the ideological spectrum do not have dramatically different responses to a Spanish-language “norm violation” (Figueroa 2018).⁵

⁵To our knowledge, no existing study assesses the effects of SL *media* availability *independent* of the immigration issue for both non-Hispanic Whites and Latinos. This is opposed to interpersonal contact, e.g. (Enos 2014), or Hopkins et al. (2014), who do not reference media as a source of Spanish exposure. Hopkins (2014), however, utilizes news clips about immigration to test the effects of language on attitudes, but he and others have not isolated the Spanish language media option from this already politically charged and racialized issue. Despite evidence of the moderating influence of ideology on media selections and effects (Hopkins 2014; Luna, Ringberg and Peracchio 2008; Stroud 2011), fewer studies in political communication have looked at the identity-related

A subset of this work builds on cognitive science, (e.g. Boroditsky 2001) drawing out key mechanisms underlying language cue effects on political attitudes (e.g., Pérez and Tavits). This work is particularly relevant for the findings we present and the theoretical arguments we offer in the section that follows. Though earlier work attributed language-based influences on political judgement to the effect of language on people’s understanding of political concepts, more recent work draws on belief-sampling frameworks (Zaller 1992). These frameworks link language cue effects to the cognitive accessibility of various political phenomena as opposed to language-cued differential meanings of them (Pérez 2016). For example, Pérez and Tavits (2019b) argue that “language increases the political salience of ethnic divides in people’s minds,” with the effect of “impacting the character of their political views.” (p.132)

Theory and hypotheses

Drawing on the work above, our central argument is that the language of news stories serves as a cue for interpreting the political world and shapes attitudes about issues and groups. By priming our awareness of group divisions, language changes the salience of differences and conflict, often affecting audience evaluations and decision-making (Carroll and Luna 2011; Flores and Coppock 2018; Koslow, Shamdasani and Touchstone 1994; Luna and Peracchio 2001; Pérez and Tavits 2019b). Cultural cues, including language, can prompt anti-immigrant sentiment among English-speaking Whites even when a threat of immigration to the group is symbolic as opposed to realistic (Newman, Hartman and Taber 2012)⁶ or when language cues

effects of language-based exposure across groups while treating language itself – independent of content or media brand – as the central prime.

⁶Realistic threats emerge when there is competition over scarce resources, such as jobs or wages, that can affect the well-being or status of a group (Bobo 1983,8; Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Olzak 1992; Sherif 1961,6; Stephan, Ybarra and Bachman 1999) or when there is a threat of consumption of governmental services and increased taxes (Passel and Fix 1994; Stephan, Ybarra and Bachman 1999), while symbolic threats are violations of beliefs, values, cultural norms or identities (Citrin et al. 1990; Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears 1988; Stephan, Ybarra and Bachman 1999)

are less overt (Hopkins, Tran and Williamson 2014).⁷ Aside from priming ethnic group threat, Hopkins (2014) suggests that Spanish language can prime political leanings and cue partisan polarization on immigration policy among White Republicans, but not White Democrats.⁸

Expanding on Flores and Coppock's (2018) claim that "choice of language highlights the intended audience, concurrently communicating the ideologies and identities associated with that group membership" (5), we argue that language in media can serve as an independent cue with respect to group identity and group differences. This is an assertion voiced earlier by Burke (1969) and later by Connaughton and Jarvis (2004) who discuss how communicative strategies, including the language, on the part of social organizations and parties may foster an individuals' identification.

Tapping into the possible cognitive mechanism, we draw on Pérez (2016) who highlights how receiving messages in a native language increases the accessibility of concepts and information. In line with this logic and belief sampling models referenced above (e.g., Zaller 1992, Pérez and Tavits 2019), we argue that the more closely associated a concept is with preexisting considerations in one's mind, including language, the less demanding it is to retrieve that concept and integrate new, related information into memory and decision-making.

SL and White English-Speakers: H1

For White English-speakers, exposure to Spanish cues the salience of group differences along with any political divisions they perceive. This can reinforce in-group identity, elicit feelings of language exclusion, and foster more negative attitudes and behavior toward "norm violating" Spanish-speakers (Hitlan, A. Zárate, Kelly and Catherine DeSoto 2016).

Especially given the close association between Spanish and Latinos in the U.S. context, this means that Spanish language may be an easy heuristic to identify all Latinos as an out-

⁷In this case, an Spanish introductory note on an English survey.

⁸This is possibly due to prior messages of Republican elites on the issue of immigration making anti-Latino affect and national identity more cognitively accessible for this group. A similar effect is not found among Latinos: Spanish-language cues do not seem to prime partisanship among Spanish-speakers (Flores and Coppock 2018; Pérez 2010)

group. Drawing from Pérez and Tavits (2019b), it is possible that hearing Spanish activates distinctly *ethnic* cleavages, and makes these cleavages more salient in the minds of White, English speakers. This may lead to a prejudice that Latinos as a whole are “unfriendly, uncooperative, unworthy of trust or even dangerous ” (Kinder and Kam 2010, 8) and “racial antipathy whereby Whites ascribe negative characteristics to [Latinos] describing them as lazy, untrustworthy, selfish and the like” (Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Hagendoorn 2007, 45). The priming of this categorization of “us” (English-speaking, White Americans) vs. “them” (Spanish-speaking Latinos) via language may shape policy preferences, particularly negative attitudes about immigration, which are closely tied to negative attitudes about Latinos as a whole (Citrin, Green, Muste and Wong 1997; Hartman, Newman and Bell 2014; Pérez 2010; Valentino, Brader and Jardina 2013).

On the contrary, Spanish may not be tied to an anti-Latino affect or racial antipathy. In her analysis of official English-only policies, Schildkraut (2005) suggests that support for these policies is racist would be a mistake. Instead, *in-group favoritism* may dominate, such that the norm violation of not speaking English is independently driving attitudes. According to polls and prior research (Schildkraut 2010,0; Stokes 2017), the English language is consistently viewed as a core component of American identity. Thus, for many English-speaking Americans, Spanish is viewed as a violation of a norm of *American* culture (Figueroa 2018). This norm violation may not match up cognitively (Pérez 2016). Given that English is closely tied to American national identity (King 2009), when English-speakers read or hear Spanish in reference to American life and events, there is an asymmetry between this and the language associations that they have encoded in memory and practiced over time. This mismatch alone may drive individuals to punish the norm violator. Alternatively, Spanish language use and distribution in the media may trigger a defense of a uniquely textitWhite, American identity. This argument closely mirrors the work of Jardina (2019) who suggests that White Americans are increasingly driven by in-group identity and favoritism. As the Spanish language becomes prominent in one’s surroundings, a perceived threat to the in-group arises and with it, comes a need to counter what may be viewed as a devaluation of their social status (Pérez 2015).

However, further analysis has provided evidence of a more distinct *out-group threat* triggered specifically by racial or ethnic minorities who speak a different language. As Figueroa (2018) shows, support for immigrants is enhanced when they are seen as following norms of American culture, including speaking fluent English. Yet, while Figueroa finds no difference between liberals and conservatives in response to the SL cue alone, she does find that levels of support differ on the basis of immigrant *ethnicity*. Her results reveal that conservatives demonstrate more positive attitudes toward an immigrant who is fluent in English *only* when the immigrant is European and liberals demonstrate more positive attitudes toward an immigrant who is fluent in English *only* when the immigrant is Mexican.

To be clear, there are likely scenarios where either in-group protectionism and/or hostility toward an out-group (in this case, hostility toward Spanish-speakers and Latinos more broadly) may be more pronounced once language primes the salience of group divisions. In the context of the media environment, the literature on group threat would suggest that negativity or opposition would be heightened in the domain of politics, as the crux of politics is the allocation of scarce resources (Blalock 1967). If policy attitudes and in-group favoritism/out-group biases are fueled, at least in part, by concerns about resources or realistic threats, it makes sense that political stories in the media cue that context for viewers, while stories related to less politically consequential topics, such as sports or entertainment, would not.

This distinction between non-political and political news is particularly important to our study. People consume the news as “monitorial citizens” scanning the environment for events that require responses (Schudson 1999). As people live multidimensional lives, they do not attempt to learn everything about politics. Instead, they scan political news specifically for threats or information that they can act upon (Zaller 2003). The news helps them accomplish this by subsidizing information, helping to facilitate opinion formation, and making politics engaging rather than boring (Zaller 2003). Spanish-language content seen by the “monitorial citizen” looking for political news may be interpreted in the context of political threat and group division. Sports news is consumed for entertainment purposes, making it unlikely to activate monitorial citizenship and less effective at cultivating citizenship than political news (Bode 2016). Our design allows us to disentangle the effects of exposure to Spanish-language

political news, not merely any form of Spanish-language news, on political attitudes.

Taken together, the above argument leads to our first hypothesis:

H1 The availability of Spanish-language political media will lead to a higher level of racial resentment against Hispanics among non-Hispanic White audiences.

SL and Spanish-Speaking Latinos: H2

In contrast to English-speaking, White Americans being exposed to a minority language, for Spanish-speakers, in-group identity and feelings of inclusion in American culture are reinforced when presented with the Spanish language by politicians, advertisers and the media. Drawing on Wilcox-Arculeta (2017), we argue that language and accessibility of Spanish language in the media serves as an ethnic identity prime, and communicates a recognition of the unique identity and cohesion of the viewing audience. This argument is reflected in the work of Casillas (2014)[3] who states that Spanish-language radio, in particular, offers “feelings of belonging or inclusion” for immigrants who are typically excluded from the larger American body politic.

Again, drawing from (Pérez 2016), the mechanism behind this enhanced feeling of “fit” may be from a perception of strengthening of ties between Spanish-language and American culture and politics. While White English-speakers, who constitute the majority in the U.S., are reminded of ethnic *divisions* when exposed to another language, the effects of exposure among Spanish-speakers, who are the linguistic minority, ought to be different. When Spanish-speakers are exposed to their own native or primary language, they may experience increased salience of ethnic *cohesion* or *belonging* in response.

This logic leads to our second hypothesis:

H2 The availability of Spanish-language political news will lead to a stronger feeling of inclusion and belonging among Spanish-speaking Latino audiences.

Experimental Analysis

We conducted two survey experiments to test our hypotheses. In Study 1, we used a sample of English-speaking, non-Hispanic White respondents to test the effect of a Spanish-language

cue (here a SL news article) on racial resentment. In Study 2, we explore the effect of Spanish-language media on a Spanish-speaking sample, assessing whether these audiences' feeling of inclusion and belonging is stronger when exposed to a SL news option rather than when exposed only to English-language news.

Study 1: White Responses to Spanish-Language Media Options

For Study 1, we recruited a total of 620 respondents from Mechanical Turk, ensuring that they were in the United States using Qualtrics geographic IP address identification tool. For our analysis, we restricted our sample to those who identified as non-Hispanic Whites, which was 495 individuals. This Whites-only sample was 52 percent male, 43 percent Democratic, and 22.8 percent Republican, with a majority of respondents (58 percent) between 26 and 40 years old. The survey was administered on April 19, 2018, and respondents were paid \$1.20 for their participation.

After asking respondents a set of demographic questions, the survey experiment presented three screens, each of which displayed three news article headlines and short blurbs drawn from popular news websites. The order in which the screens were displayed was randomized. The headlines and blurbs displayed on each screen were thematically consistent: one displayed political news headlines, another contained sports news headlines, and another contained entertainment news headlines. For all respondents, all three entertainment stories were displayed only in English. Only two screens, the ones containing headlines for stories related to sports and politics, contained the experimental manipulation: a Spanish-language version of one of the headlines and blurbs. The other stories remained constant.

The experiment is therefore a 2 by 2 design. In condition 1, respondents saw only English headlines across all screens. Respondents in condition 2 were shown three English language political stories on the politics page and on the sports screen, were shown one Spanish language story and two English language stories. Respondents in condition 3 were shown two English stories and one Spanish story on the political news screen and shown three EL stories on the sports screen. Respondents in condition 4 were shown one Spanish language story and two English language stories on both the politics screen and the sports screens. Table 1 summarizes

the experimental conditions.

[Table 1 near here]

Our analyses examine whether seeing a politics article or non-politics article in Spanish has different effects on political attitudes of Whites and Spanish-speaking Latinos. Respondents were asked to choose which of these articles they would prefer to read in each given set of articles, but the choice they made was irrelevant to our analyses. Respondents were instead differentiated based upon whether or not they were exposed to a Spanish-language politics or sports article.

The political article that randomly appeared either in English or Spanish dealt with the response of a Texas school district to student activism that arose after the Parkland, Florida school shooting on February 14, 2018. The headline read, in English, “A school district in Texas threatens to suspend students who participate in protests of the #neveragain movement,” with a short blurb afterwards introducing the first several lines of the story. An example of the Spanish politics choice condition as it would appear in Conditions 3 and 4 as described above can be seen in Figure 2, below.

[Figure 2 near here]

The sports article that randomly appeared in either language concerned the digital broadcast rights of the National Football League’s Thursday night games: the headline read, in English, “Digital battle for Thursday night NFL games.” These articles were chosen as the subjects of the manipulation because the issues they discuss, school shootings and the National Football League, are not traditionally associated with Hispanic or Latinx communities.

The other articles also did not concern issues traditionally associated with the Latinx community. In the politics choice set, the additional articles were about the Illinois governor’s race primary (“Insurgents jolt Illinois governor’s race”) and the efforts of Democratic members of Congress to secure funding to prevent Russian election interference (“Dems demand budget boost to shield midterms from Russian interference”), while the other sports articles concerned a football injury and a basketball injury to professional players. There was no Spanish-language

option in the set of entertainment articles, which also avoided figures or issues commonly associated with the Latinx community.

After seeing the three article sets, respondents were asked about their opinions and activities in each of the three subject areas (sports, entertainment, and politics). The sports questions were asked first, including an attention check requiring respondents to leave the answer blank.⁹ The politics questions were asked next, including questions rating politicians and the major parties, the respondents' opinions on legal and illegal immigration, and a set of questions designed to measure political efficacy, followed by a set of questions concerning entertainment preferences (including attending movies in theaters and ownership of personal entertainment devices).

Following the political questions, a set of questions aimed at measuring attitudes towards Hispanics and Latinos was asked. The first questions asked were the four parts of a racial resentment index towards Hispanics. Each question was adapted from the racial resentment index in the American National Election Studies (ANES), with "Blacks" replaced by "Hispanics." The racial resentment index has proven to be a powerful predictor of political attitudes in other contexts (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Tesler 2016), and may reveal effects that straightforward questions on immigration or other racialized issues ignore. Racial resentment is separate from non-racial political dispositions, and is grounded in social considerations about racial group hierarchy, and resentment in particular (Simmons and Bobo 2018). Recent scholarship has also found evidence that racial enmity today is shifting towards cultural foundations, and that racial resentment indices are particularly well-suited to capture that element of Whites' opinions (separate from political considerations). Several other questions on racial attitudes followed, including attitudes towards perceived criminality and assimilation of Hispanics, but our focus was on the classic racial resentment index questions.

⁹The prompt stated: "Everyone has hobbies. Nonetheless, we would like you to skip this question to show that you are reading carefully. Do not select any of the options for bike riding, swimming, playing sports, reading or watching T.V." If respondents selected any hobby, they were automatically directed to the end of the survey.

Study 2: Spanish-Speakers' Responses to Spanish-Language Media Options

Study 2 examines how the availability of Spanish-language media affects Spanish-speaking Latino audiences' attitudes (H2) by presenting a nearly identical survey experiment as found in Study 1, except with every question and answer choice translated into Spanish. The news article choice sets (in English except for the randomized Spanish articles), order, and most of the opinion measures were exactly the same as in the English-language Study 1. The survey was conducted from March 19 - March 23, 2018. We used the survey firm Qualtrics to recruit a sample of Spanish-speaking respondents, which were then filtered using a fluency screener question: "Que tan bien hablas español?" Respondents who did not answer "Muy bien" ("very well") from a set of several options were skipped to the end of the survey. This left us with a sample of 362 respondents: 56.6 percent were male, 40.3 percent Democratic, and 35.6 percent Republican, with a majority of respondents (59.1 percent) between 26 and 40 years old.

One crucial addition to the questions asked in Study 1 will be our focus in the analyses below. We asked a set of questions designed to measure a sense of belonging in the United States. This set of questions asked Spanish-speaking respondents to assess several statements on a scale from "Strongly disagree" to "Strongly agree" ("Firmamente desacuerdo" to "Firmamente di acuerdo"). These statements (translated) include: "I feel like I belong in the United States," "Most Americans value and respect my individual presence in the United States," "I feel like an outsider in the United States," and "Other people try to exclude me from U.S. society." These questions allow us to directly assess H2, in which we predict that Spanish-language media options will increase feelings of inclusion and belonging among Spanish-speaking audiences.

Results

We estimate the effect of the availability of Spanish-language media in the choice sets presented to respondents on non-Hispanic White (Study 1) and Spanish-speaking (Study 2) audiences, with results of regression analyses presented in Table A1 of the appendix. White audiences' general racial attitudes are assessed using the Hispanic racial resentment index, a combined measure of the four traditional racial resentment index questions, rescaled from 0-1 (Columns 1-3). Spanish-language respondents' attitudes are assessed according to their agreement with

the statement, “I belong in the United States” rescaled from 0-1, and “Most Americans value and respect my individual presence in the United States,” rescaled from 0-1. Full results appear in the Appendix.

Study 1

Compared to those who saw all articles in English, Whites who saw a politics article in Spanish and all sports articles in English scored 7.4 percent higher on the Hispanic racial resentment index (Column 1, Table A1; $p < 0.1$). There was no similar effect for viewing an article about sports in Spanish compared to the group which saw all articles in English (Column 2). Put differently, there is no effect among White respondents of seeing an article about a non-politics topic in Spanish. Given the lack of significant effects of a sports article, we combined the conditions into those who saw a politics article in English and those who saw a politics article in Spanish, which comprised the entire sample. Using this distinction, those who saw a politics article blurb in Spanish scored 5.3 percent higher on the Hispanic racial resentment index than those who saw the same politics article blurb in English, a statistically significant difference ($b = 0.053$, $p < 0.05$).¹⁰ These results are shown as marginal predicted probabilities in Figure 3.

[Figure 3 near here]

The results from Study 1 demonstrate partial support for H1. The mere presence of an article about politics in Spanish, even when the topic does not concern traditionally Hispanic and Latino issues, significantly increased racial resentment towards Hispanics among White respondents.¹¹

¹⁰We also conducted a pilot study with an undergraduate student subject pool and found similar results in a slightly different choice set (involving a political article concerned with immigration). Student subjects in the conditions with a politics article in Spanish scored 5.8 percent higher on racial resentment toward Hispanics ($n = 248$; $p < 0.1$). These results can be found in Table A2 of the Appendix, along with a description of the differences in the treatment.

¹¹In an analysis in the Appendix, we test for similar effects on racial attitudes among Spanish-speakers, finding no significant effects on racial resentment of Hispanics, or perceptions that Whites, Blacks, or Hispanics are “lazy” or “criminal.” These analyses can be found in Table A4.

However, we do have reason to believe that the Spanish-language cue may have different effects across partisans, depending on the issue being reported or discussed. We know from (Hopkins 2014) that SL cues prime White Republicans, but importantly, this effect occurs on a previously racialized issue (immigration). From Tesler (2015), we can infer that for issues that are not racialized, the effects may be different. In this case, it is likely that Democrats, not Republicans, will be susceptible to *racial spillover effects* from the SL prime. This is due to the fact that Democrats' political preferences are more heavily influenced by racial attitudes (see for example, Kinder and Dale-Riddle 2012; Kam and Kinder 2012; Carmines and Sniderman 1997).

[Figure 4 near here]

In splitting our analysis of Whites by partisanship, as shown in Figure 4, we do find evidence of this racial spillover effect for Democrats, where those exposed to the SL politics article score 6.92% higher ($p < 0.025$) on the racial resentment index than those who were not. There is no significant difference, however, between White Republicans who see a SL politics article and those who are only exposed to English language choices (for full results, see Table A2 in the Appendix).

Study 2

The results from Study 2 on the attitudes of Spanish-speakers partially confirm H2, as visualized in Figure 5 and detailed in Table A1 of the Appendix. Here, we find a significantly stronger feeling of inclusion among those who are exposed to Spanish-language political news.

[Figure 5 near here]

Comparing those who saw a politics article in Spanish and all sports articles in English to those who saw all articles in English, Spanish-speakers' feelings of belonging in the United States increased by 9.8 percent (Column 4, Table A1; $p < 0.1$). Once again, there is no effect of seeing a Spanish-language sports article (Column 5). Comparing those who saw the politics article in Spanish to those who saw it in English, as above, the effect is large and significant:

a 9.6 percent increase in respondent's feelings of belonging in the United States ($p < 0.05$). Additionally, Spanish-speaking respondents who read a politics article in Spanish felt more respected in the United States than those who saw politics articles in English (Column 7, Table A1; $b = 0.241$, $p < 0.05$).¹²

Together, these studies demonstrate that the mere introduction of Spanish-language political news into an individual's media choice set can influence the attitudes of both English-speaking Whites and Spanish-speaking Hispanics, even if the content of that article does not reference issues traditionally associated with Hispanic political causes. The Spanish language, when introduced into the media choice sets of consumers, increases racial resentment towards Hispanics among Whites while increasing feelings among Spanish-speakers that they belong and are accepted in the United States.

Discussion and Conclusions

This study builds on several bodies of literature. The first is a long tradition of research that has documented the effect of Spanish-language media on issue attitudes (Abrajano and Singh 2009; Hopkins 2014). While this work provides numerous valuable insights, much of it does not disentangle whether effects from exposure to Spanish language media extend beyond immigration or other racialized issues and whether the effects are language or content-based.

Our experimental design addresses this gap by exposing participants to non-immigration-related topics such as student activism and sports. We find that the effect of a Spanish-language news option still holds when the news content does not concern traditionally Hispanic/Latinx issues. Immigration is not necessarily central to the linkage between Spanish-language exposure and racial attitudes. Mere exposure to the Spanish language in political news can influence

¹²In an analysis in the Appendix (Figure A1 & Table A3), we explore the moderating role of English proficiency. Those Spanish-speakers who speak English "very well" are more likely to have increased feelings of belonging when exposed to a Spanish-language politics article than those who report speaking English less than "very well." This difference could be explained by their bilingualism or their ability to distinguish that the set of articles was political. We leave the question of bilingual response to Spanish-language media availability to future research.

attitudes by activating monitorial citizenship (Zaller 2003), priming group identities (Flores and Coppock 2018), ethnic divisions (Pérez 2016; Pérez and Tavits 2019b), political leanings (Hopkins 2014), and other types of ethnic consciousness (Figueroa 2018; Kerevel 2011). And, because we hold content constant in our experiment (manipulating only the language of news prompt through the use of a native Spanish speaking translator), we can be confident that our findings are language-based, rather than content-based. language-based effects we observe are confined to the domain of political news, reinforcing our expectation that news consumption is fundamentally different than seeing it in the context of non-political topics such as sports. Future research should examine these effects with news about other non-political domains of life, such as entertainment or lifestyle news.

Another body of work on which we build focuses on language as a group cue. It relies on insights from cognitive science (e.g., Boroditsky 2001) and belief-sampling frameworks (e.g., Pérez and Tavits 2019; Zaller 1992) to theorize and show that language is likely cuing group divisions by making them more cognitively accessible in people's minds (Pérez and Tavits 2019). Specifically, theoretical insights from this work lead us to expect that, in the U.S. context, exposure to Spanish (as a non-majority language) will shape the attitudes of English speakers (as users of the majority language) by priming *ethnic* divisions, thereby increasing the likelihood they are considered when rendering political judgements. Along this logic, we find that racial resentment toward Hispanics increases with exposure to SL political news stories. Here, we contribute by extending existing theoretical insights to a new domain: news media. That we find no similar effect for English speakers shown no Spanish option falls in line with the expectation that exposure to a majority spoken language will only weakly prime ethnic divisions (Pérez and Tavits 2019), with the implication that other considerations will rise in prominence to affect political judgement in lieu of salient political-ethno conflicts or tensions.

That Spanish-language cues affect racial resentment only among White English-speakers, and only when the news story is about politics (as opposed to softer forms of news), raises interesting questions regarding cognitive accessibility, as well as some possible limitations of our own design. On the one hand, the Pérez and Tavits' (2019) hypothesis implies we should be more likely to see effects from a Spanish language cue when delivered in the context of

politics. However, it is also quite possible that the nature of the outcome questions we asked - racial resentment items and questions about one's sense of belonging - are political enough to bias our study in favor of identifying effects only in the domain of political news. However, we don't think this is the case. We think media exposure is fundamentally different, highlighting the importance of extending this line of work to the political media environment.

One additional finding in our work is that White racial resentment toward Hispanics can increase as a result of the interaction between Spanish-language political news cues and partisanship. When the news topic is not racialized, White Democrats are susceptible to the "racial spillover effects" from a Spanish-language political news prime, while the option of SL news makes no difference on the attitudes of White Republicans. This counters Hopkins' (2014) finding on the issue of immigration, where the availability of Spanish-language media splits the political opinions among Republicans but not Democrats. Our results suggest that the influence of SL media on the attitudes of partisans depends upon whether or not the issue presented is racialized (Tesler 2015).

Our findings among Spanish speaking Latinos also extend the theoretical expectations set forth in extant work on language cues, albeit in a qualified way. Because the theoretical expectations in recent work are couched in terms of majority/minority language status (Pérez and Tavits 2019), it does not provide us with a clear set of expectations for how the attitudes of native speakers of the minority language will be affected. On the one hand, Spanish might be the majority-use language for individuals' immediate personal and/or professional context. On the other hand, English is still the predominate language used in U.S. society at large. That we get no effects indicating increasing racial resentment against Whites or Latinos when Spanish-speakers are shown a Spanish news story option is in line with Pérez and Tavits (2019). However, this also suggests that majority/minority language status should be theorized at the individual or group level as opposed to the societal level, as we have done here. We developed our hypothesis for Spanish-speakers based on the intuition that for the case we examine here - exposure to Spanish language news options - language cues operate differently according to the individual group member exposed. When Spanish-language speakers are exposed to Spanish news, we expected to still see a priming effect, but one that operates differently than

for English speakers. Given that exposure to Spanish for a Spanish speaker signals similarity rather than difference, we hypothesized that this kind of exposure should prime ethnic cohesion, or a sense of belonging, rather than ethnic divisions. This dovetails prior work on the role of ethnic media in cultural assimilation (Kim 1988; Moon and Park 2007) and in line with Pérez (2016), suggests that Spanish-language media exposure is serving to increase the accessibility of information on American politics and culture. Though we find support for our hypothesis, what we cannot yet sort out is the mechanism. Does Spanish language news prime belonging by making the presence of many other Spanish speakers seem more salient, or is it the mere existence of this service provision that primes something like cultural inclusion at the societal level? Future research on related questions should explore these avenues much further.

Regardless, the importance of this finding on the mediated “sense of belonging” for Latinos cannot be understated. While the feeling of belonging tested in this study emphasizes something akin to “cultural belonging” (Brettell 2006), it also pertains to other facets of the political life of Spanish speakers, including how they construct political membership, cultural identity, and attitudes toward citizenship. In the words of (Trudeau 2006)[423], “belonging necessarily entails bounded classifications of characteristics associated with membership in a polity,” which points to a possible effect of belonging on an augmented affiliation to political parties or organizations among Latinos.

Like any study, this one is not without limitations. An important point this research did not address is whether exposure to Spanish-language content affects non-Latino Whites’ sense of belonging. In particular, if interactions with diverse cultural backgrounds are found to have a larger impact on Latinos perception of belonging compared to their White peers (Lamont 2008), this is worthy of exploration in future research. Future studies should also include more comprehensive question batteries, especially those aimed at capturing the diversity of respondents speaking non-majority languages, such as the richly heterogeneous Latinx population in America. Specifically, prospective research should include details about language use, foreign-born status, length of time in U.S. (or country of study) and native born country (if different than country of study). Such work will also benefit from a wider array of questions used to capture racial/ethnic animus. Here we utilized a widely used measure of racial resentment. Though

it was initially designed to capture resentment toward African Americans, some evidence suggests its applicability for use with other groups (Simmons and Bobo 2018). However, other recent work suggests that white Americans' animus toward Latinos is a unique blend of racism and ethnicism driven by a complex history, and that studies of Latino animus would benefit from measures developed specifically to capture the complexities of Latino experiences in the U.S. (e.g., Ramirez and Peterson N.d.). In future work, we plan to incorporate such measures.

Other non-English languages such as Chinese, French, Vietnamese, or Korean, all of which are among the top 10 languages spoken in the U.S., may not produce the same impact as Spanish. Our framework may provide some expectations. For White English-speakers, exposure to a non-majority language primes group divisions and activating preexisting out-group perceptions toward the minority language's speakers. For example, Asian-Americans are often portrayed positively: as law-abiding, well-educated, and high-achieving citizens (Guo and Harlow 2014), and are seen as less unfavorable than other minority groups (Wilson 1996). On the other hand, Asians and other minority groups still lag behind Latinos in their population size and media availability, which may indicate a weaker "threat" and lower the probability of exposure. Turning to minority-language media effects on minorities, there is also great variation in loyalty to ethnic languages across groups (Fishman 1966), especially among the second-generation who know English well. Latinos claim a higher bilingual proficiency and better knowledge of their language than Asians (Portes and Hao 1998). As such, other non-English languages are likely to exert distinct effects. For the sake of deeper understanding of this phenomenon, subsequent research should indulge these speculations.

Another potential limitation, as in any survey experiment, is external validity: specifically, are non-Hispanic Whites actually likely to encounter Spanish-language media in their everyday lives? Researchers' need to present realistic treatments is always a trade-off with their ability to control study designs in the effort to disentangle the exact mechanisms of the effects they hope to discover. While Spanish-speaking Americans are likely to encounter English-language media consistently, non-Hispanic Whites' likelihood of exposure to Spanish-language media is often geographically determined. Spanish-language media is not spread equally around the country, as Figure 1 shows. However, there is substantial Spanish-language media presence in

America today in both political and sports news. Channel-surfing past Univision or ESPN Deportes, scrolling through Google News-style online portals, or scanning channels on the radio may lead to an encounter with this sort of content. Field experimentation, or more externally valid presentations of article options (as in a Google News style online portal, see Pingree et. al 2018), represent an important direction for additional advances on this topic.¹³

Limitations aside, our findings verify both theoretical and empirical insights provided by recent research: Spanish language serves as a politicized symbol in the U.S. context, the impact of exposure most likely operates through salience of our politicized identities, and the behavioral effects are variable across individuals and groups. Acknowledging these effects, and the ways in which media availability and media choice influence their potency, is especially important in the contemporary setting where all politics is identity politics.

¹³We are encouraged about the validity of our effects by supplemental analyses, presented in Table A6 of the Appendix, that show similar effects of Spanish-language media on non-Hispanic Whites using observation data from the 2004 National Annenberg Election Study. See the Appendix for full results and details.

References

- Abrajano, Marisa and Simran Singh. 2009. "Examining the link between issue attitudes and news source: The case of Latinos and immigration reform." *Political Behavior* 31(1):1–30.
- Abrams, Jessica R and Howard Giles. 2007. "Ethnic identity gratifications selection and avoidance by African Americans: A group vitality and social identity gratifications perspective." *Media psychology* 9(1):115–134.
- Blalock, H. M. 1967. *Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations*. New York: Wiley.
- Bobo, Lawrence. 1983. "Whites' opposition to busing: Symbolic racism or realistic group conflict?" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 45(6):1196.
- Bobo, Lawrence. 1988. "Attitudes toward the black political movement: Trends, meaning, and effects on racial policy preferences." *Social Psychology Quarterly* pp. 287–302.
- Bode, L. 2016. "Political news in the news feed: Learning politics from social media." *Mass Communication and Society* 19(1):24–48.
- Boroditsky, Lera. 2001. "Does language shape thought?: Mandarin and English speakers' conceptions of time." *Cognitive psychology* 43(1):1–22.
- Brader, Ted, Nicholas A Valentino and Elizabeth Suhay. 2008. "What triggers public opposition to immigration? Anxiety, group cues, and immigration threat." *American Journal of Political Science* 52:959–978.
- Branton, Regina and Johanna Dunaway. 2008. "English-and Spanish-language media coverage of immigration: a comparative analysis." *Social Science Quarterly* 89(4):1006–1022.
- Branton, Regina P and Johanna Dunaway. 2009. "Spatial proximity to the USMexico border and newspaper coverage of immigration issues." *Political Research Quarterly* 62(2):289–302.
- Brettell, Caroline B. 2006. "Political belonging and cultural belonging: Immigration status, citizenship, and identity among four immigrant populations in a Southwestern city." *American Behavioral Scientist* 50(1):70–99.
- Bureau, US Census. 2017. "FFF: Hispanic Heritage Month 2017." <https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/newsroom/facts-for-features/2017/>

cb17-ff17.pdf (Accessed 06/2018).

- Burke, Kenneth. 1969. *A rhetoric of motives*. Vol. 178 Univ of California Press.
- Carmines, Edward G and Paul M Sniderman. 1997. "Reaching Beyond Race."
- Carroll, Ryall and David Luna. 2011. "The other meaning of fluency." *Journal of Advertising* 40(3):73–84.
- Casillas, Dolores Inés. 2014. *Sounds of belonging: US Spanish-language radio and public advocacy*. New York: NYU Press.
- Caspi, Dan, Hanna Adoni, Akiba A Cohen and Nelly Elias. 2002. "The red, the white and the blue: The Russian media in Israel." *Gazette (Leiden, Netherlands)* 64(6):537–556.
- Chaffee, Steven H, Clifford I Nass and Seung-Mock Yang. 1990. "The bridging role of television in immigrant political socialization." *Human Communication Research* 17(2):266–288.
- Chavez, Leo Ralph. 2001. *Covering immigration: Popular images and the politics of the nation*. University of California Press Berkeley.
- Citrin, Jack, Beth Reingold, Evelyn Walters and Donald P. Green. 1990. "The "Official English Movement" and the Symbolic Politics of Language in the United States." *The Western Political Quarterly* 43(3):535–559.
- Citrin, Jack, Donald P. Green, Christopher Muste and Cara Wong. 1997. "Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations." *The Journal of Politics* 59(3):858–881.
- Citrin, Jack and Matthew Wright. 2009. "Defining the Circle of We: American Identity and Immigration Policy." *The Forum* 7(3).
- Connaughton, Stacey L and Sharon E Jarvis. 2004. "Apolitical politics: GOP efforts to foster identification from Latinos, 1984–2000." *Communication Studies* 55(3):464–480.
- Dalisay, Francis. 2012. "Media use and acculturation of new immigrants in the United States." *Communication Research Reports* 29(2):148–160.
- De Fina, Anna. 2013. "Top-down and bottom-up strategies of identity construction in ethnic media." *Applied linguistics* 34(5):554–573.
- De Vreese, Claes H. and Hajo Boomgaarden. 2006. "News, political knowledge and par-

- icipation: The differential effects of news media exposure on political knowledge and participation.” *Acta Politica* 41(4):317–341.
- Delli Carpini, Michael X. and Scott Keeter. 1996. *What Americans Know About Politics and Why it Matters*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dixon, Matt. 2018. “Scott boosts TV spending to \$3M with new Spanish-language ad.” <https://www.politico.com/states/florida/story/2018/04/18/scott-boosts-tv-spending-to-3m-with-new-spanish-language-ad-370418> (Accessed 07/2018).
- Dixon, Travis L. 2008. “Crime news and racialized beliefs: Understanding the relationship between local news viewing and perceptions of African Americans and crime.” *Journal of Communication* 58(1):106–125.
- Dunaway, Johanna, Regina P Branton and Marisa A Abrajano. 2010. “Agenda setting, public opinion, and the issue of immigration reform.” *Social Science Quarterly* 91(2):359–378.
- Enos, Ryan D. 2014. “Causal effect of intergroup contact on exclusionary attitudes.” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* .
- Espenshade, Thomas J and Charles A Calhoun. 1993. “An analysis of public opinion toward undocumented immigration.” *Population Research and Policy Review* 12(3):189–224.
- Figuroa, Lucila. 2018. “Cultural Norms and Immigrants in the United States: The Green Card Experiment.” *Journal of Race, Ethnicity and Politics* (1-38).
- Fishman, J. A., ed. 1966. *Language Loyalty in the United States: The Maintenance and Perpetuation of Non-English Mother Tongues by American Ethnic and Religious Groups*. London: Mouton Co.
- Flores, Alejandro and Alexander Coppock. 2018. “Do Bilinguals Respond More Favorably to Candidate Advertisements in English or in Spanish?” *Political Communication* pp. 1–22.
- Gilens, Martin. 2009. *Why Americans hate welfare: Race, media, and the politics of antipoverty policy*. University of Chicago Press.
- Gilliam Jr, Franklin D and Shanto Iyengar. 2000. “Prime suspects: The influence of local television news on the viewing public.” *American Journal of Political Science* pp. 560–573.

- Grabar, Henry. 2017. "How "Press One for English" Became an Anti-Immigrant Meme." http://www.slate.com/blogs/always_right/2017/09/11/most_companies_don_t_ask_you_to_press_one_for_english_but_that_doesn_t_stop.html(Accessed 06/2018).
- Guo, L. and S. Harlow. 2014. "User-generated racism: An analysis of stereotypes of African Americans, Latinos, and Asians in YouTube videos." *Howard Journal of Communications* 25(3):281–302.
- Hartman, Todd K, Benjamin J Newman and C Scott Bell. 2014. "Decoding prejudice toward Hispanics: Group cues and public reactions to threatening immigrant behavior." *Political Behavior* 36(1):143–163.
- Hitlan, Robert T, Kristine M Kelly, Stephen Schepman, Kimberly T Schneider and Michael A Zárate. 2006. "Language exclusion and the consequences of perceived ostracism in the workplace." *Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice* 10(1):56.
- Hitlan, Robert Thomas, Michael A. Zárate, Kristine M Kelly and M Catherine DeSoto. 2016. "Linguistic ostracism causes prejudice: Support for a serial mediation effect." *The Journal of social psychology* 156(4):422–436.
- Hopkins, Daniel J. 2011. "Translating into Votes: The Electoral Impacts of Spanish-Language Ballots." *American Journal of Political Science* 55(4):814–830.
- Hopkins, Daniel J. 2014. "One Language, Two Meanings: Partisanship and Responses to Spanish." *Political Communication* 31(3):421–445.
- Hopkins, Daniel J., Van. C. Tran and Abigail. F. Williamson. 2014. "See no Spanish: language, local context, and attitudes toward immigration." *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 2(1):35–51.
- Huntington, Samuel P. 2004. *Who Are We: The Challenges to America's National Identity*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- James, Meg. 2017. "Spanish-Language Univision touts its rebound from ratings struggle." <http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/la-et-entertainment-news-updates-may-spanish-language-univivions-touts-its-1495048859-htlmstory.html> (Accessed 06/2018).

- Jardina, Ashley. 2019. *White Identity Politics*. Cambridge University Press.
- Kam, Cindy D and Donald R Kinder. 2012. "Ethnocentrism as a short-term force in the 2008 American presidential election." *American Journal of Political Science* 56(2):326–340.
- Kerevel, Yann P. 2011. "The Influence of Spanish-Language Media on Latino Public Opinion and Group Consciousness." *Social Science Quarterly* 92(2):509–534.
- Kim, Young Yun. 1988. *Communication and cross-cultural adaptation: An integrative theory*. Multilingual Matters.
- Kinder, Donald R and Allison Dale-Riddle. 2012. *The end of race?: Obama, 2008, and racial politics in America*. Yale University Press.
- Kinder, Donald R and Cindy D Kam. 2010. *Us against them: Ethnocentric foundations of American opinion*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kinder, Donald R and David O Sears. 1981. "Prejudice and politics: Symbolic racism versus racial threats to the good life." *Journal of personality and social psychology* 40(3):414.
- Kinder, Donald R. and Lynn M. Sanders. 1996. *Divided By Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals*. The University of Chicago Press.
- King, Desmond. 2009. *Making Americans: Immigration, race, and the origins of the diverse democracy*. Harvard University Press.
- Koslow, Scott, Prem N Shamdasani and Ellen E Touchstone. 1994. "Exploring language effects in ethnic advertising: A sociolinguistic perspective." *Journal of consumer research* 20(4):575–585.
- Lamont, Strayhorn, T. 2008. "Sentido de pertenencia: A hierarchical analysis predicting sense of belonging among Latino college students." *Journal of Hispanic Higher Education* 7(4):301–320.
- Liu, Wenlin and John Gastil. 2014. "Pathways of immigrant political socialization: Examining the role of news media, social connections, and community interaction." *Journal of Intercultural Communication Research* 43(3):238–263.
- Luna, David and Laura A Peracchio. 2001. "Moderators of language effects in advertising to bilinguals: A psycholinguistic approach." *Journal of Consumer Research* 28(2):284–295.
- Luna, David, Torsten Ringberg and Laura A Peracchio. 2008. "One individual, two identities:

- Frame switching among biculturals.” *Journal of Consumer Research* 35(2):279–293.
- Mastro, Dana. 2009. “Effects of racial and ethnic stereotyping.” *Media effects: Advances in theory and research* 3:325–341.
- Mastro, Dana E and Bradley S Greenberg. 2000. “The portrayal of racial minorities on prime time television.” *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media* 44(4):690–703.
- Mendelberg, Tali. 2001. *The race card: Campaign strategy, implicit messages, and the norm of equality*. Princeton University Press.
- Moeller, Judith and Claes de Vreese. 2013. “The differential role of the media as an agent of political socialization in Europe.” *European Journal of Communication* 28(3):309–325.
- Moon, Seung-jun and Cheong Yi Park. 2007. “Media effects on acculturation and biculturalism: A case study of Korean immigrants in Los Angeles’ Koreatown.” *Mass Communication & Society* 10(3):319–343.
- Moy, Patricia, Michael R McCluskey, Kelley McCoy and Margaret A Spratt. 2004. “Political correlates of local news media use.” *Journal of Communication* 54(3):532–546.
- Naficy, Hamid. 1993. *The making of exile cultures: Iranian television in Los Angeles*. U of Minnesota Press.
- Newman, Benjamin J., Todd K. Hartman and Charles S. Taber. 2012. “Foreign Language Exposure, Cultural Threat and Opposition to Immigration.” *Political Psychology* 33(5):635–657.
- Olzak, Susan. 1992. *The dynamics of ethnic competition and conflict*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Ortiz, Michelle and Elizabeth Behm-Morawitz. 2015. “Latinos’ perceptions of intergroup relations in the United States: The cultivation of group-based attitudes and beliefs from English-and Spanish-language television.” *Journal of Social Issues* 71(1):90–105.
- Ostfeld, Mara. 2017. “Unity Versus Uniformity: Effects of Targeted Advertising on Perceptions of Group Politics.” *Political Communication* 34(4):530–547.
- Panagopoulos, Costas and Donald P Green. 2011. “Spanish-language radio advertisements and Latino voter turnout in the 2006 congressional elections: Field experimental evidence.” *Political Research Quarterly* 64(3):588–599.

- Park, R.E. 1922. *The immigrant press and its control*. New York: Harper and Brothers.
- Passel, Jeffrey S and Michael Fix. 1994. "Myths about immigrants." *Foreign Policy* (95):151–160.
- Pérez, Efrén O. 2010. "Explicit evidence on the import of implicit attitudes: The IAT and immigration policy judgments." *Political Behavior* 32(4):517–545.
- Pérez, Efrén O. 2011. "The origins and implications of language effects in multilingual surveys: A MIMIC approach with application to Latino political attitudes." *Political Analysis* 19(4):434–454.
- Pérez, Efrén O. 2015. "Ricochet: How elite discourse politicizes racial and ethnic identities." *Political Behavior* 37(1):155–180.
- Pérez, Efrén O. 2016. "Rolling off the tongue into the top-of-the-head: explaining language effects on public opinion." *Political Behavior* 38(3):603–634.
- Pérez, Efrén O and Margit Tavits. 2019. "Language Influences Public Attitudes Toward Gender Equality." *The Journal of Politics* 81(1):81–93.
- Pérez, Efrén O and Margit Tavits. 2019b. "Language Heightens the Political Salience of Ethnic Divisions." *Journal of Experimental Political Science* pp. 1–10.
- Pingree, Raymond J., Brian Watson, Mingxiao Sui, Kathleen Searles, Nathan P. Kalmoe, Joshua P. Darr, Martina Santia and Kirill Bryanov. 2018. "Checking facts and fighting back: Why journalists should defend their profession." *PLOS ONE* 13(12):1–14.
URL: <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0208600>
- Portes, A. and L. Hao. 1998. "E Pluribus Unum: Bilingualism and language loss in the second generation." *Sociology of Education* 71(4):269–294.
- Ramasubramanian, Srividya, Marissa Joanna Doshi and Muniba Saleem. 2017. "Mainstream Versus Ethnic Media: How They Shape Ethnic Pride and Self-Esteem Among Ethnic Minority Audiences." *International Journal of Communication* 11(21).
- Ramirez, Mark D. and David A. Peterson. N.d. *Distinct racism Latina/o-specific animus and White Americans political choices*.
- Santa Ana, Otto. 2002. *Brown tide rising: Metaphors of Latinos in contemporary American public discourse*. University of Texas Press.

- Schildkraut, Deborah J. 2007. "Defining American Identity in the 21st Century: How much "there" is there?" *Journal of Politics* 69(3):597–615.
- Schildkraut, Deborah J. 2010. *Americanism in the twenty-first century: Public opinion in the age of immigration*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schildkraut, Deborah Jill. 2005. *Press one for English: Language policy, public opinion, and American identity*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
- Schudson, M. 1999. *The Good Citizen: A History of American Civic Life*. Harvard University Press.
- URL:** <https://books.google.com/books?id=aawMAQAAMAAJ>
- Sears, David O. 1988. Symbolic racism. In *Eliminating Racism: Profiles in controversy*. New York: Plenum Press.
- Shearer, Elisa. 2017. "Hispanic and African American News Media Fact Sheet." *Pew Research Center: Journalism and Media* .
- Sherif, Muzafer. 1961. *Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers Cave Experiment*. Norman, OK: Institute of Group Relations.
- Sherif, Muzafer. 1967. *Group Conflict and Co-operation: Their Social Psychology*. London: Psychology Press.
- Shi, Yu. 2005. "Identity construction of the Chinese diaspora, ethnic media use, community formation, and the possibility of social activism." *Continuum* 19(1):55–72.
- Shumow, Moses. 2010. "A foot in both worlds: Transnationalism and media use among Venezuelan immigrants in South Florida." *International Journal of Communication* 4:21.
- Simmons, Alicia D. and Lawrence D. Bobo. 2018. "UNDERSTANDING NO SPECIAL FAVORS: A Quantitative and Qualitative Mapping of the Meaning of Responses to the Racial Resentment Scale." *Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race* 15(2):323352.
- Slater, M. D. 2007. "Reinforcing spirals: The mutual influence of media selectivity and media effects and their impact on individual behavior and social identity." *Communication Theory* 17(3):281–303.
- Sniderman, Paul M, Aloysius Hagendoorn and Louk Hagendoorn. 2007. *When ways of life col-*

- lide: Multiculturalism and its discontents in the Netherlands*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
- Soto, Victoria M DeFrancesco and Jennifer L Merolla. 2006. "Vota por tu futuro: Partisan mobilization of Latino voters in the 2000 presidential election." *Political Behavior* 28(4):285–304.
- Stamm, Keith R, Arthur G Emig and Michael B Hesse. 1997. "The contribution of local media to community involvement." *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 74(1):97–107.
- Stephan, Walter G, Oscar Ybarra and Guy Bachman. 1999. "Prejudice Toward Immigrants." *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 29(11):2221–2237.
- Stokes, Bruce. 2017. *Language: The Cornerstone of National Identity*. Technical report Pew Research Center. <http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/02/01/language-the-cornerstone-of-national-identity/> Accessed 08/2018.
- Stroud, Natalie Jomini. 2011. *Niche news: The politics of news choice*. Oxford University Press on Demand.
- Sui, Mingxiao and Newly Paul. 2017. "Transnational political engagement: Asian Americans' participation in US politics and in the politics of their nation of origin." *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics* 2(3):273–292.
- Tesler, Michael. 2015. "The conditions ripe for racial spillover effects." *Political Psychology* 36:101–117.
- Tesler, Michael. 2016. *Post-racial or most-racial?: Race and politics in the Obama Era*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Trudeau, Daniel. 2006. "Politics of belonging in the construction of landscapes: place-making, boundary-drawing and exclusion." *Cultural geographies* 13(3):421–443.
- Tukachinsky, Riva, Dana Mastro and Moran Yarchi. 2015. "Documenting portrayals of race/ethnicity on primetime television over a 20-year span and their association with national-level racial/ethnic attitudes." *Journal of Social Issues* 71(1):17–38.
- Valentino, Nicholas A, Ted Brader and Ashley E Jardina. 2013. "Immigration opposition among US Whites: General ethnocentrism or media priming of attitudes about Latinos?" *Politi-*

- cal Psychology* 34(2):149–166.
- Valentino, Nicholas A, Vincent L Hutchings and Ismail K White. 2002. “Cues that matter: How political ads prime racial attitudes during campaigns.” *American Political Science Review* 96(1):75–90.
- Viswanath, Kasisomayajula and Pamela Arora. 2000. “Ethnic media in the United States: An essay on their role in integration, assimilation, and social control.” *Mass Communication & Society* 3(1):39–56.
- Waldman, Paul, Elbert Ventura, Robert Savillo, Susan Lin and Greg Lewis. 2008. “Fear and loathing in prime time: Immigration myths and cable news.” <http://www.ilw.com/articles/2008,0709-waldman.shtm> (Accessed 08/2018).
- Wang, Amy B. 2018. “My next call is to ICE!': A man flipped out because workers spoke Spanish at a Manhattan deli.” https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2018/05/16/my-next-call-is-to-ice-watch-a-man-wig-out-because-workers-spoke-spanish-at-a-manhattan-deli/?utm_term=.40f84d8bc0e1 (Accessed 06/2018).
- Wilcox-Archuleta, Bryan. 2017. “Local Origins: Context, Group Identity, and Politics of Place.” *Political Research Quarterly* pp. 1–15.
- Wilson, T. C. 1996. “Cohort and Prejudice: Whites’ Attitudes toward Blacks, Hispanics, Jews, and Asians.” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 60(2):253–274.
- Zaller, John. 2003. “A New Standard of News Quality: Burglar Alarms for the Monitorial Citizen.” *Political Communication* 20(2):109–130.
- Zaller, John R. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Table 1: Experimental Conditions for Study 1 and Study 2

Condition 1	<i>"No SL Choice"</i>	Condition 2	<i>"1 SL Choice (Sports)"</i>
Politics Screen	3 EL Stories	Politics Screen	3 EL Stories
Sports Screen	3 EL Stories	Sports Screen	2 EL Stories + 1 SL Story
Entertainment Screen	3 EL Stories	Entertainment Screen	3 EL Stories
Condition 3	<i>"1 SL Choice (Politics)"</i>	Condition 4	<i>"2 SL Choices"</i>
Politics Screen	2 EL Stories + 1 SL Story	Politics Screen	2 EL Stories + 1 SL Story
Sports Screen	3 EL Stories	Sports Screen	2 EL Stories + 1 SL Story
Entertainment Screen	3 EL Stories	Entertainment Screen	3 EL Stories

Figures




Figure 1: Growth of local Spanish language media availability: 2000 (Top), 2004 (Middle), 2008 (Bottom). Dark counties have no Spanish language media (television or newspaper).
Source: Author compilation: Spanish language television outlets and Spanish language newspapers.

Lea cada titular que fue seleccionado por sorteo y sus descripciones. Cual historia escogería para leer si solo pudiera leer una?

- Un distrito escolar en Texas amenaza con suspender a alumnos que participen en protestas del movimiento #neveragain**

En una carta enviada a padres de familia y publicada en Facebook, el superintendente del Distrito Escolar de Needville (en el suroeste de Houston), Curtis Rhodes, amenaza con sancionar a los estudiantes que se involucren en cualquier tipo de demostración o protesta política relacionada con el tiroteo que cobró la vida de 17 personas en una escuela de Parkland, Florida.

- Insurgents jolt Illinois governor's race**

The Illinois governor's race was supposed to be a clash of two fabulously rich politicians, an election so expensive that it might end up costing more than a quarter-billion dollars. But with just four weeks to go until the March 20 primary, it's not certain that Illinois Gov. Bruce Rauner and billionaire Democrat J.B. Pritzker will be their parties' nominees.

- Dems demand budget boost to shield midterms from Russian interference**

Congressional Democratic leaders on Wednesday called for more than \$300 million in new funding to help safeguard this November's elections against Russian interference. But they stopped short of courting any shutdown battles over the issue ahead of next month's must-pass government spending bill.

Figure 2: Experimental condition: A Spanish-language politics article in an online choice set.




Figure 3: White Response to Spanish-Language News

Note: Full results and model specification appear in Table A1 in the Supplemental Appendix. Marginal predicted probabilities calculated and visualized using marginsplot in Stata.




Figure 4: Racial resentment among White respondents: Democrats v. Republicans

Note: Full results and model specification appear in Table A3 in the Supplemental Appendix. Marginal predicted probabilities calculated and visualized using marginsplot in Stata.




Figure 5: Spanish-Speakers' Response to Spanish-Language News

Note: Full results and model specification appear in Table A1 in the Supplemental Appendix. Marginal predicted probabilities calculated and visualized using marginsplot in Stata.